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I. INTRODUCTION
During the summer of 1999, I was working on an article about Planned
Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists,' a case in which Planned
Parenthood and several abortion providers sued a radical anti-abortion group
and some of its members for violating the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act, I presented my preliminary thesis to a group of colleagues. My
thesis was and is that the defendants' conduct is not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection.
My thesis produced a strong, negative reaction from many of my col-
leagues. One colleague, frustrated by what he no doubt thought was a seriously
misguided position, asked, "on your theory, Marc Antony would not be entitled
to First Amendment protection?" Taken aback, I dodged the question like a
first year law student stumped by a hypothetical that seemed to trap him in his
own illogic. Had I hit a dead end in my thesis? My colleague, a Constitutional
law scholar and First Amendment expert, seemed to suggest that the law was
settled that Marc Antony would indeed be entitled to a First Amendment
defense for his funeral oration.
I survived the evening with my colleagues, refined my thesis to address
some of their objections, finished my article2 and went on to other topics. But I
continued to reflect on my colleague's question about Marc Antony. When
Professor Carl Tobias asked me whether I might submit an article to the
Nevada Law Journal, I decided to take the opportunity to consider the question
posed by my colleague in more depth than was possible in my earlier article.
As a Criminal Law professor, I began considering the question by reflecting on
what two other Shakespearean characters tell us about the First Amendment.
This essay develops my thoughts about lago, the villain in Othello, and
Lady MacBeth, obviously one of the villains in MacBeth. To do so, I first
discuss principles of accomplice liability. No competent lawyer in America
would argue that either Iago or Lady MacBeth was entitled to a First Amend-
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; J.D., University of
Pennsylvania, 1974; B.A., Swarthmore College, 1969. I wish to thank my colleague Brian
Landsberg for sharing his insights into the First Amendment.
1 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999), vacated by Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of
Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
2 Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the First Amendment,
61 OHIO STATE L.J. 1175 (2000).
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ment defense. In fact, our legal system would find both of them guilty of mur-
der despite the fact that their only conduct involved speech.3 While Marc
Antony may appear to have a more plausible First Amendment defense, I argue
that, consistent with the Supreme Court's First Amendment case law, he could
nonetheless be found guilty of inciting violence or encouraging murder.
II. SPEECH As CRIME
Under traditional criminal law doctrine, a person may be guilty of a crime
based only on speech in a number of settings.4 In examining the possible crim-
inal conduct of lago, Lady MacBeth, and Marc Antony, this section focuses on
principles governing accessory or accomplice liability.
As stated by Professor Dressler in his leading criminal law treatise, "a
person may be held accountable for the conduct of another person if he assists
the other in committing an offense."5 Accomplice liability has posed some of
the most interesting analytical problems in the criminal law and has become the
topic of a number of important scholarly articles.' Somewhat anomalous in the
criminal law, a person becomes an accessory based upon another's conduct,
rather than one's own chosen acts.7 Instead, if a person associates himself with
the acts of another person, he derives liability from the actor.8 Liability is for
the act that the accomplice has encouraged the principal to commit.9
A person may become an accomplice in innumerable ways. One might
provide a murderer with the murder weapon or serve as a lookout or getaway
driver for a robber."1 But as long as evidence of an intent to aid is sufficient, a
person may become an accomplice merely by offering words of encourage-
' In Macbeth, after Lady MacBeth exhorts her husband to kill Duncan, the King, she tells
him that she will get the King's guards drunk, allowing him to get past the guards. While
that assistance alone would also make her an accomplice, as discussed in this essay, she
would be liable for murder as an accomplice based on her speech alone. See WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 1, sc. 7 (John F. Andrews ed., GuildAmerica Books 1990)
[hereinafter MacBeth].
4 Solicitation and conspiracy are two obvious examples. The Model Penal Code states that
a person is guilty of a criminal offense if "he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to
engage in such conduct" or "with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of
the offense, he solicits such other person to commit it." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06.
5 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 30.01, at 427 (2d ed. 1995) (cita-
tion omitted).
6 See, e.g., Joshua Dressier, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Lia-
bility: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985); Sanford H. Kadish,
Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV.
323 (1985); Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609 (1984).
7 Dressier, supra note 6, at 103; see also Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for
the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 702 (1930).
8 Kadish, supra note 6, at 337-42.
9 Id.
1" See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 161 P.2d 285 (Cal. App. 2d 1945) (serving as a lookout
sufficient to be liable for the crime committed by the principal); see also DRESSLER, supra
note 5, § 30.04, at 435-36 (giving examples of the kinds of conduct that may lead to liability
of an accomplice).
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ment. ' Hence, shouting "attaboy" as an offender prepares to shoot his victim,
or cheering a person who is committing an offense, may be sufficient to make
the offender an accomplice.'
2
A variety of interesting analytical problems arise because liability is deriv-
ative. For example, at common law, a person who aids an undercover police
officer will not be guilty of the underlying offense because the principal (the
officer) will not be guilty of a crime. 3 Hence, despite obvious culpability, the
accomplice escapes liability. Similar problems exist at common law if the prin-
cipal is acquitted of the underlying offense.' 4 Because to the formalistic mind
an accomplice cannot derive liability from an acquitted principal, the accom-
plice must also go free. Similar conundrums abound in the common law's
treatment of accomplices.15
While the common law, at times, acquits dangerous accomplices on for-
malistic grounds, the common law and modern accomplice liability law, at
times, criminalize those whose role seems quite minor. Remember that the
accomplice has the same liability as the principal, even if the accomplice's role
is minor. A wife, who provides her husband dinner, fortifying him to commit
serious felonies, may be equally liable for his completed crimes. 16 Leading
criminal law texts include a case that routinely outrages law students, Wilcox v.
Jeffery, 7 in which the defendant paid for a ticket to a concert where Coleman
Hawkins, famous American jazz musician, performed in England without
securing proper work papers. Wilcox, according to the court,
paid for his ticket. Mr. Hawkins went on the stage and delighted the audience by
playing the saxophone. The appellant did not get up and protest in the name of the
musicians of England that Mr. Hawkins ought not to be here competing with them
and taking the bread out of their mouths and the wind out of their instruments. It is
not found that [the appellant] actually applauded, but he was there having paid to go
in, and, no doubt, enjoying the performance .... 18
Unfortunately, cases like Wilcox may give accomplice liability a bad name.
"' Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442 (1893) (reversing conviction for murder because
evidence of intent was ambiguous; but the Court stated that words of encouragement may be
sufficient to sustain a conviction).
12 See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
647 (6th ed. 1995). The answer to their hypothetical, a variation of the facts of Hicks, 150
U.S. 442, is almost certainly that, had Hicks shouted "attaboy" as Rowe threatened his vic-
tim, he would have been guilty as an accomplice to murder.
11 See, e.g., Vaden v. State, 768 P.2d 1102 (Alaska 1989) (relying on "the long-standing
common law rule that the act of a feigned accomplice may never be imputed to the target
defendant for purposes of obtaining a conviction").
" See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 30.03[B][5], at 434 (citing the common law to the effect
that acquittal of the principal meant that an accessory could not be prosecuted).
15 See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 6, at 339-41. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06, cmt. 9
(dealing with cases involving whether a victim, for example, a victim of extortion, becomes
an accomplice).
16 State v. Duran, 526 P.2d 188 (N.M. 1974) (holding perpetrator's child while he commits
the crime is sufficient assistance); Alexander v. State, 102 So. 597 (Ala. App. 1925) (deliver-
ing dinner to husband while he is engaged in a felony is sufficient aid to make the witness an
accomplice, requiring state to corroborate her testimony).
17 1 All E.R. 464 (K.B. 1951).
'8 Id. at 466.
Summer/Fall 2002]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
Accomplice liability is also anomalous in the criminal law because a pros-
ecutor does not have to prove that an accomplice caused the crime to occur. 9
Indeed, were causation a requirement, a prosecutor would face formidable theo-
retical and practical constraints. As a theoretical matter, as developed in Pro-
fessor Kadish's important article on accomplice liability, the criminal law
generally refuses to treat one person's act as the cause of another's conduct.
That is so because of the criminal law's insistence that we are all free-will
actors.20 Hence, the accomplice does not cause the principal to act when she
encourages his conduct; the principal remains free to choose to commit the
crime. As a practical matter, requiring a prosecutor to prove that, but for the
accomplice's encouragement, a principal would not have committed a particu-
lar crime is almost certainly a matter of pure speculation, not subject to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Despite hard cases like Wilcox, perhaps better described as the result of
the poor judgment of an excessively zealous prosecutor, and despite ways in
which accomplice liability departs from traditional criminal law doctrine,
accomplice liability serves an important role in the criminal law. As is the case
with co-conspirators, accomplices increase the danger that a crime will be com-
mitted.2 ' Accomplices may provide the necessary encouragement to push the
doubting principal to the point of action and may provide meaningful assistance
that allows the crime to be completed.22
Some of the debate about accomplice liability understates the protection
the law provides those accused of accomplice liability. Unlike many areas of
the criminal law, accomplice liability turns on proof of intent. 23 Typically, an
accomplice must intend to promote or facilitate the actual offense; knowledge
that his words or actions may aid the commission of the offense is
insufficient.24
That requirement has, at times, raised concerns in particularly hard cases.
In first proposing that knowledge be sufficient, the first tentative draft of the
Model Penal Code cited a variety of examples where a person might provide
substantial aid, but lack criminality because of the intent requirement. For
example, the drafters cited the case of "[a] lessor [who] rents with knowledge
that the premises will be used to establish a bordello. A vendor [who] sells
with knowledge that the subject of the sale will be used in the commission of a
",25crime....
19 See SANFORD KADISH, A Theory of Complicity, in ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
PHILO-SOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.L.A. HART 288 (1987). See also Dressier, supra note 6
(criticizing the absence of a requirement of causation).
20 KADISH, supra note 19.
21 Fuller v. State, 198 So. 2d 625, 630 (Ala. App. 1966) (accomplices' presence may
encourage by adding numbers). See also DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 29.03[B], at 395.
22 Fuller, 198 So. 2d at 630.
23 In many areas of the criminal law, even if a statute requires the state to prove "intent," the
mens rea element is satisfied if the state proves that the defendant knew that the harm would
result. See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 10.04, at 105-06, for examples.
24 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (requiring "purpose" as the mens rea) and § 2.06, cmt.
6(c) (discussing the intent requirement and reasons why the Code rejected "knowledge" as
sufficient mens rea).
25 Id.
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The Model Penal Code eventually rejected the extension of liability to
those who lacked purpose, but knew their conduct would result in the further-
ance of the underlying offense.26 Commentators have offered various justifica-
tions for the position taken by the drafters of the Code. For example, Professor
Fletcher has argued that extending liability to those who act with knowledge,
but not purpose, is akin to asking whether to impose a duty to act to prevent
impending harm.2 7 Typically, the criminal law imposes no such duty. Others
have emphasized concern about imposing unfair inconvenience to legitimate
business transactions.2 8 For various reasons, courts tend to retain the stringent
intent or purpose requirement.
The strict mens rea requirement also serves an important role in cases
involving accomplice liability where the accomplice's conduct consists only of
words of incitement or encouragement. 29 The criminal law does not articulate
concern about the First Amendment as a rationale for the strict mens rea
requirement. However, modem First Amendment law has imposed a similar
strict mens rea requirement on cases where a speaker interposes a credible First
Amendment defense.3 ° Courts developing accomplice liability may not have
been influenced by First Amendment concerns. At least as a matter of history,
the law imposed a strict mens rea requirement in accomplice liability cases long
before the Supreme Court imposed a similar mens rea requirement in its mod-
em case law. 3' My point here is that at least some concerns about imposing
proper limitations on accomplice liability are answered when we focus on the
mens rea requirement. The mens rea requirement allows an accomplice a plau-
sible defense in many cases. For example, in the kind of case that troubles
Professor Dressier,32 a wife who aids her husband by serving him dinner to
fortify him to commit his criminal offense, may force the state to prove not
only that she knew that her husband was going to commit the offense but that
she encouraged that offense, i.e., that she actively desired that he commit the
offense and that is why she provided the aid. Passive acquiescence is insuffi-
cient to demonstrate intent. Or where a speaker's words incite a mob to vio-
lence, he can force the state to prove not just that he was aware that his words
might incite the crowd but also that he spoke the words with the desire that his
speech would produce that result.33
These background principles of the criminal law help develop my thesis,
that Marc Antony would not only be subject to prosecution for inciting the
mob's murder of Brutus and his co-conspirators, but also that he should be
subject to prosecution. To develop my thesis, I want first to explore how the
26 Id.
27 GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 676 (1978).
28 See, e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 369-70 (2d ed.
1961).
29 See infra discussion at notes 94-99.
30 See infra discussion at notes 94-99.
3' See Dressier, supra note 6, at 96-97 (discussing legislative reform of accomplice liability,
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century). By contrast, a specific intent requirement, as part
of the Supreme Court's First Amendment case law, emerged in the late 1960s and early
1970s. See infra discussion at notes 131-38.
32 Dressler, supra note 6, at 102.
33 See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
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traditional principles play out for lago and Lady MacBeth where, as in
Antony's case, the offenses consisted solely of words.
III. IAGO AND LADY MACBETH
lago is not just pure evil; he is a criminal. And yet, his conduct consists of
nothing but words. Despite that, under modern criminal law doctrine, he would
be guilty of murder.
For those unfamiliar with Shakespeare's Othello, lago is a false friend to
Othello, a successful warrior and Moor of Venice.3 4 lago intentionally turns
Othello against his faithful and loving wife, Desdemona.3 5 He does so by con-
vincing Othello that Desdemona is carrying on an affair with Cassio, one of
Othello's faithful lieutenants.3 6 In the end, Othello murders Desdemona.3 7
In their leading criminal law textbook, Professors Kadish and Schulhofer
use the facts of Othello to explore issues of accomplice liability. They ask, "If
Othello would be guilty of no more than manslaughter, should it follow that
lago cannot be convicted of first-degree murder? ' 38
A word of explanation is necessary to understand both why Othello may
be guilty of manslaughter instead of murder, and then why lago's precise crime
- murder or voluntary manslaughter - is open to question. The law has long
recognized provocation as a partial defense to murder. Sufficient provocation
reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter. The formal argument is that provo-
cation negates the malice necessary for the killing to be murder.39 As a matter
of policy, courts view the provoked actor as less culpable than the actor who
acts rationally.4 °
At common law, courts limited cases in which a defendant might interpose
a provocation defense.4 ' Quite typically, for example, a defendant could not
raise the partial defense unless he witnessed his wife in the act of intercourse.42
Modern courts have rejected such narrow definitions of the defense and have
allowed it in a far wider range of cases.4 3
Obviously, Othello never saw the faithful Desdemona in flagrante delicto
with Cassio. Iago arranged for Othello to witness Desdemona and Cassio talk-
ing intimately together.' He also arranged for his wife to take a scarf that
Othello gave Desdemona and then had the scarf planted among Cassio's pos-
sessions.45 Even though those events would be insufficient to provide Othello
34 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO (John F. Andrews ed., GuildAmerica Books 1990)
[hereinafter Othello].
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at act 5, sc. 2.
38 KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 680.
31 See, e.g., State v. Thornton, 730 S.W.2d 309 (Tenn. 1987).
40 See Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862), overruled on alternative grounds by People v.
Woods, 416 Mich. 864 (1982).
41 See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 31.07[2][a], at 491.
42 See, e.g., Holmes v. Pub. Prosecutions, 2 All E.R. 124 (K.B. 1946).
43 See, e.g., Maher, 10 Mich. at 212; Commonwealth v. Berry, 336 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1975);
People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976); People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980).
'4 Othello, supra note 34, at act 3, sc. 3, In. 1-38.
41 Id. at In. 293-319.
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a provocation defense at common law, were Othello charged with murder in a
jurisdiction following more modern rules governing provocation, he might be
found guilty of voluntary manslaughter if the jury found that a reasonable per-
son would have been provoked under similar circumstances.46
lago's criminal liability poses interesting legal questions. Almost cer-
tainly, a prosecutor would charge lago with murder based on principles of
accomplice liability. Accomplice liability poses courts with some of the most
interesting analytical questions in the criminal law. As discussed above, the
criminal law criminalizes the accomplice because, by encouraging a particular
crime, he adopts the criminal conduct as his own. Accomplice liability is
derivative liability. At common law, the accomplice could be found liable only
for the same crime as the principal because the accomplice derived liability
from the principal.4 7
Scholars have questioned whether lago might be guilty of murder even if
Othello would be guilty only of voluntary manslaughter.4 8 If lago is guilty as
an accomplice, i.e., he derives his liability from Othello, he would be guilty
only of voluntary manslaughter despite his intent that Othello kill. That result,
perhaps not troubling to formalistic thinkers, is anomalous to modem criminal
law theorists. Professor Kadish has explained how the criminal law may avoid
the anomaly of punishing lago for only voluntary manslaughter despite his pre-
meditation and malice; Othello's actions are not fully volitional because lago
has rendered him partially incapacitated by his poisonous words. Despite the
law's hesitation to treat one person as the cause of another's conduct, this
would be a case in which lago would be treated as the cause of Desdemona's
death because he has rendered Othello incapable of acting with malice.49
For my analysis of the First Amendment and the criminal law, the above
example is especially important. The example represents one in which the law
recognizes the extraordinary power of words alone. Words may render a free-
will actor incompetent. Despite the criminal law's resistance to finding one
person the cause of another's criminal conduct, in this situation, words alone
may be sufficiently powerful to do just that.
No competent criminal lawyer would attempt to interpose a First Amend-
ment defense on behalf of Iago.i ° Too much case law has established that the
accomplices whose conduct consists entirely of encouraging words may be
found guilty along with the principal. Where commentators have objected to
accomplice liability, their objections have usually focused on concerns about
whether an accomplice's punishment is proportional to the underlying, and
occasionally fairly minor role that he may have played, rather than on concerns
46 See, e.g., Maher, 10 Mich. at 212; Commonwealth, 336 A.2d at 262; Berry, 556 P.2d at
777.
17 See supra discussion at notes 13-15.
" See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 680.
'9 SANFORD H. KADISH, BLAME AND PUNISHMENT 183 (1987); see also WILLIAMS, supra
note 28, at 391; GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 374 (2d ed. 1983).
50 Even in their extremely critical assessment of the Supreme Court's First Amendment case
law, David R. Dow and R. Scott Shieldes suggest that when a speaker overwhelms or con-
trols the will of the listener, the state may properly convict the speaker. Dow & Shieldes,
Rethinking the Clear and Present Danger Test, 73 IND. L.J. 1217, 1219 (1998).
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about whether the offender ought to be criminalized at all. 5' And even then, I
doubt that those scholars would disagree with Professor Kadish that Iago would
be and should be guilty of murder.
52
One might object that my example does not prove very much about the
state's ability to criminalize an offender whose conduct consists only of speech.
Iago's words are false and the law gives less protection to those who lie than
those who tell the truth.
For example, despite limiting the ability of a state to impose liability for
defamation because of First Amendment concerns, the Supreme Court has
found that false statements are entitled to less protection than true statements.
Cases like New York Times v. Sullivan53 require a plaintiff to make a higher
showing than state law might otherwise require, if the plaintiff is a public offi-
cial or public figure.54 The Court is concerned with assuring vigorous debate
on matters of public concern and with preventing government from stifling crit-
icism of its policies.55 But the Court leaves the states free to allow such suits
and imposes few restrictions on the states if the plaintiff is not a public figure.
States may legitimately protect a person's reputation from falsehoods.5 6 Thus,
one could argue that a state may legitimately prosecute lago or other false
swearers with little concern about the First Amendment because the First
Amendment's protection of intentionally false statements is non-existent.
Perhaps. But in other areas, the criminal law has fully criminalized speak-
ers whose crime consisted of truthful statements. Here, Lady MacBeth pro-
vides a helpful example. Early in MacBeth, three witches hail MacBeth as the
future king.5 7 He and Lady MacBeth agree that he will kill Duncan, the King,
so that MacBeth can fulfill the prophecy.58 But in his memorable soliloquy,
MacBeth suffers from momentary doubts about whether he should commit
murder.5 9 When Lady MacBeth learns that her husband has lost his resolve,
she delivers one of the most famous speeches in all of Shakespeare, 60 a speech
5 Dressier, supra note 6. Dressler also argues that ignoring the general requirement that the
state must prove that a defendant caused a particular result before he may be found guilty
leads to disproportionate punishment. Id. at 103-08.
52 For example, Professor Dressier would impose liability for acts done by others if the
accomplice caused the actor's conduct. Id. at 120-30. See also Dow & Shiledes, supra note
50, at 1219.
5' 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
51 While the Court has extended First Amendment protection to public figures, it has more
often than not found that the particular plaintiff was not a public figure. See, e.g., Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979);
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1970).
" Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
56 See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48 (recognizing a state's interest in protecting individu-
als from injury to their reputations).
57 Macbeth, supra note 3, at act 1, sc. 3, In. 46-48, 60-67.
58 Id. at act 1, sc. 7.
51 Id. at act 1, sc. 7, In. 1-28.
6 When Macbeth tells his wife that he has changed his plans, she counters with:
What Beast was't then/That made you break this Enterprise to me?/When you durst do it you
were a Man;/And to be more that what you were, you would/Be so much more the Man. Nor
Time, nor Place/Did then adhere, and yet you would make both./They've made themselves, and
that their Fitness now/Does unmake you. I've given Suck, and know/How tender 'tis to love the
Babe that milks me;/I would, while it was smiling in my Face,/Have pluck'd my Nipple from his
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which demonstrates why we criminalize conspiracy and aiding and abetting.
The single actor may lose his resolve; the presence of additional parties
increases the likelihood that a planned crime will take place. In response to her
exhortation to "screw your courage to the sticking-place,' MacBeth
announces that "I am settl'd. ' 62 Thereafter, he commits the crime.6 3 Unlike
lago's speech, hers is not false.
As discussed above, accomplice liability is demonstrated by a showing
that the accomplice assisted the commission of the crime.6 4 Assistance is
defined broadly to include mere encouragement of the crime. In theory, an
accomplice derives her liability from the actor. By encouraging the act, the
accomplice makes the act her own. As a result, unlike the law governing con-
65spiracy, she is not guilty of a separate offense of aiding and abetting. She is
fully liable for the completed, intended offense.6 6
Commentators have raised a variety of criticisms of accomplice liability.
67
But the MacBeth hypothetical is an easy case in which, despite criticism of
accomplice liability generally, critics of accomplice liability should have no
trouble recognizing that criminalizing Lady MacBeth is an appropriate result.
One might hesitate to criminalize an accomplice because in some cases the
accomplice's intent may be uncertain. In this case, however, Lady MacBeth's
forceful speech leaves no doubt about her intent.68
Commentators also express concern that the encouragement or assistance
provided by the accomplice is often insignificant and may be provided by one
who has little choice but to acquiesce. For example, Professor Dressler raises
issues of proportionality in a case involving a wife who serves her criminal
husband dinner which fortifies him to commit his crimes. 69 The aid provided
seems insignificant - for example, her aid seems quite remote and irrelevant to
whether her husband would have committed the crime anyway - but nonethe-
less leads to her conviction for the completed crime as long as the prosecutor
can show that she intended to aid the criminal conduct. In addition, if the law
criminalizes accomplices because they demonstrate their dangerousness by
endorsing the actor's crime, this may not apply in the case of the wife who may
have few options but to serve her husband. She may be trapped in an abusive
relationship and have few skills that would let her leave him even if she had the
resolve to do so.
Boneless Gums/And dash'd the Brains out had I so sworn as you/Have done to this ... We fail?/
But screw your Courage to the Sticking-place/And we'll not fail.
Id. at act 1, sc. 7, In. 47-61.
61 Id. at In. 59-60.
62 Id. at In. 79.
63 Id. at act 2, sc. 2.
64 See supra notes 6-17 and accompanying text.
65 See DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 29.03, at 395-96 (discussing approach to conspiracy and
concluding that in most states, a conspiracy to commit a felony is punished less severely than
the target offense).
66 Dressier, supra note 6, at 92.
67 See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 6; Dow & Shieldes, supra note 50.
68 Macbeth, supra note 3. See also supra note 60.
69 Dressier, supra note 6, at 102.
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Lady MacBeth hardly resembles the wife in Alexander v. State.7 ° Her
encouragement is forceful, unequivocal, and rhetorical, delivered at a moment
when MacBeth's resolve wanes.7 But for the criminal law's hesitation to say
that one person causes another person (with his own free will) to act,7 2 one
might be tempted to argue that Lady MacBeth's words did cause her husband
to act. Quite unlike the wife in Alexander, Lady MacBeth is no shrinking vio-
let, unable to escape a domineering husband. She is a forceful participant in a
dangerous plot that results in murder.
Again, as in lago's case, competent counsel would not dream of interpos-
ing a First Amendment defense on behalf of Lady MacBeth, even if her crime
consists of nothing but words. In both cases, society may justly punish both
offenders even though another person committed the immediate act leading to
death. The two examples demonstrate ample historical precedent that we do
criminalize offenders whose conduct consists only of words, and, while some
cases raise moral questions about the appropriateness of punishing accom-
plices, lago and Lady MacBeth's cases prevent no hard moral questions. Their
punishment is deserved.
IV. MARC ANTONY
In the 1920s, Judge Learned Hand and Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr.
first discussed whether Marc Antony would be entitled to a First Amendment
defense if he was charged with inciting violence for his funeral oration for
Caesar. 3 Here, I develop the setting in which Antony delivered his oration
which led to the mob's action against Caesar's assassins and why we may be
disinclined to criminalize Antony. Thereafter, I summarize some of the leading
First Amendment cases that bear on whether Antony's conduct is criminal and
then, after I conclude that the Supreme Court case law does not provide a defin-
itive answer about whether his speech would be protected, I explore why he
should not be entitled to a First Amendment defense as a matter of law.
Despite the fact that Antony's crime consisted entirely of speech, even if possi-
bly construed as political speech, he would not be entitled to a judgment of
acquittal as a matter of law.
Brutus, one of Caesar's trusted friends, joins a conspiracy to murder Cae-
sar when his co-conspirators convince him that Caesar intends to become a
king and a tyrant.74 Even before the murder, Brutus convinces his co-conspira-
tors they should not murder Caesar's close friend, Marc Antony. 75 After Bru-
tus murders Caesar, he again convinces his co-conspirators that they need not
fear Antony, that he, Brutus, should give the funeral oration to convince the
70 See cases supra note 16.
71 See supra note 59.
72 KADISH, supra note 49.
73 Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modem First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L, REv. 719, 729 n.41 (1975) (letter from Zechariah
Chafee Jr. to Learned Hand).
74 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 1, sc. 2 (William Montgomery ed., Penguin
Books 2000) [hereinafter Caesar].
71 Id. at act 2, sc. 1, In. 181-83.
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people of Caesar's plan to become a tyrant.76 Confident he can defuse the
crowd's desire for vengeance for Caesar's death, Brutus convinces his cohorts
that they can then allow Antony to address the crowd as part of appropriate
burial rites.7 7
Brutus miscalculated his own persuasive powers and underestimated
Antony's. In one of the most famous of all Shakespearean speeches, Antony
plays the crowd to perfection.78 Like the successful trial lawyer, he opens with
a powerful theme: Brutus is an honorable man, as are his cohorts. 79 And so
what Brutus said must be so. But, while he repeats his refrain, that Brutus is an
honorable man and so his statements must be so, he undercuts each one, first by
reference to Caesar's treatment of him,8" and eventually by evidence found in
Caesar's will, evidence of Caesar's concern for the common people. 81
As Antony works the crowd, members of the crowd, not Antony, cry out
for the blood of the traitors. He disclaims his desire to stir up the crowd; for
example, at one point, he states, "Good friends, sweet friends, let me not stir
you up/To such a sudden flood of mutiny. 82 Antony consciously avoids
explicit words urging revenge against the conspirators. Members of the crowd
begin early in his oration to call for revenge upon the traitors and in the end,
when the crowd leaves to do so, again members of the mob, not Antony, speak
the explicit words of vengeance: "Come, away, away!/We'll burn [Caesar's]
body in the holy place,/And with the brands fire the traitors' houses .. "83
Not surprisingly, members of the mob route out the conspirators and kill
them. 84
Why might we be inclined to grant Antony a First Amendment defense?
Within the play, Antony is the hero and seeks justice against a group that has
committed a coup d'etat. Still, whether he and the mob might be justified in
killing the conspirators would be determined by principles of necessity, not, in
Antony's case, a defense grounded in the First Amendment.85
From my perspective, as a Criminal Law professor, Antony's liability
resembles that of Lady MacBeth and lago. Despite his protestations to the
76 Id. at act 3, sc. 1, In. 238-44.
77 Id.
78 Id. at act 3, sc. 2, In. 73-244.
79 Id. at In. 82-83.
80 Id. at In. 178-79.
81 Id. at In. 235-43.
82 Id. at In. 204-05.
83 Id. at act 3, sc. 2, In. 245-47.
84 Id. at act 4, sc. 2, In. 225-32 & act 5, sc. 5.
85 In most jurisdictions, necessity does not provide a defense in cases involving murder.
Under narrow circumstances, the Model Penal Code would recognize such a defense. "Con-
duct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or another is
justifiable, provided that: the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater
than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged .... " MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.02. The necessity defense way also apply to homicide, though in most
cases the evil to be prevented is likely less than or equal to the evil of an intentional murder.
Yet, the comments state that "it would be particularly unfortunate to exclude homicidal con-
duct from the scope of the defense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, cmt. 3. However, many
states have explicitly excluded intentional homicide that would otherwise be a murder from
the defense. Id.
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contrary, he is a forceful orator who plays his audience brilliantly. Unlike lago,
Antony did not render his audience incompetent. As a result, the criminal law
would not treat Antony as the cause of the mob's violence.86 But, as developed
above, the criminal law does not require a prosecutor to prove that an aider and
abettor caused the actors' conduct; it is enough that the speaker encouraged the
conduct (and thereby demonstrated a desire to take the actors' conduct as his
own). 87 Both before and after his oration, Antony makes clear that his goal is
to produce the very result that his words produce.88 Like Lady MacBeth, his
powerful rhetoric results in murder.
Antony's is a difficult case for reasons that relate more to the embarrass-
ing history of our First Amendment case law than with sound principles of
criminal law. Many of the leading First Amendment cases were decided during
the "Red Scare" after the First World War and, later, during the "Red Scare"
that followed the Second World War with the beginning of the Cold War.89
Many of those cases involved what today we would call nothing more than
political speech, entitled to the greatest First Amendment protection. At the
time, political dissent could lead to serious consequences. Debs v. United
States,90 especially for those of us who remember the powerful anti-war rheto-
ric during the Vietnam war, is a low water mark, even in an era of bad First
Amendment law. The Supreme Court affirmed Debs' conviction for violating
the Espionage Act of 1917.91 His conduct amounted to what can fairly be
characterized as an anti-war speech.92 Relying on earlier precedent, Debs
found that the state must prove only that the defendant's words represented a
clear and present danger that they will produce a harm that Congress may pre-
vent.93 Further, it upheld a jury's determination that Debs' "natural and
intended effect" was to frustrate the war effort. 9
4
During the 1920 term, for the first time, Justice Holmes, joined by Justice
Brandeis, began to dissent in a number of cases in which the defendants' "con-
duct" was, at least in large part, political speech. For example, they dissented
in Abrams v. United States, a case in which several Bolshevik sympathizers
dropped leaflets onto the streets of New York.95 The leaflet opposed United
States support of anti-Soviet forces in the Russian revolution and called for a
strike to prevent shipment of weapons to those forces. 96 The Supreme Court
affirmed their conviction based on the Espionage Act, which was amended in
1918 to make it unlawful to urge curtailment of military production with an
86 See KADISH, supra note 49.
87 See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
88 Caesar, supra note 74, at act 3, sc. 1, In. 257-300, & act 4, sc. 1, In. 29-47.
89 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Vitiello, supra note 2, at 1199-217.
90 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
91 Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 30, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1994)).
92 See Debs, 249 U.S. at 213-14 for the text of Debs' speech.
93 Id. at 213-14, 216-17.
94 Id. at 215.
95 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 620-23.
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intent to hinder the war against the Germans.97 According to the majority,
imputing knowledge to the defendants that the strikes they urged would neces-
sarily harm the war effort against the Germans satisfied the intent element. 98
Justice Holmes' dissent argued that the First Amendment prevented Con-
gress from forbidding "all efforts to change the mind of the country." 99 As a
result, the First Amendment required a showing that the defendants had a spe-
cific intent to cause the harm that Congress sought to prevent. While Holmes
read the Espionage Act to require specific intent, he found the evidence of that
intent insufficient.,o Without more, knowledge that one's speech or conduct
may bring about a particular harm is not enough to demonstrate that the speaker
intended that result.
Elsewhere, Justices Holmes and Brandeis continued to object when a state
or the national government criminalized a person's abstract advocacy. For
example, they objected to the Court's affirmance of Anna Whitney's conviction
for criminal anarchy and syndicalism based on nothing more than her presence
at a Communist Labor Party Convention where the party adopted a resolution
supporting the revolutionary working class movement in America. 01 Among
other concerns, Justices Holmes and Brandeis argued that the Court improperly
deferred to the California legislature's determination that the result advocated
by the Convention was a clear and present danger.1 0 2 Instead, they would have
required proof of that fact at trial. As a result, the statute might lead to convic-
tion, as appeared to be the case before the Court, for mere abstract advocacy.
More must be required because of the risk of stifling all political dissent. That
risk exists because "[elvery denunciation of existing law"'103 increases the
probability that the law will be violated. In their view, the First Amendment
allows dissenting voices to challenge existing laws without fear of
prosecution. 104
Holmes and Brandeis insisted that, as a matter of substantive law, a legis-
lature can only criminalize speech when the danger is clear and present.1 05 In
their view, as a matter of procedure, a court is not bound by a legislature's
determination that a danger is clear and present and has a greater than normal
role in reviewing a jury's determination that a harm is sufficiently imminent
and that a speaker has the requisite intent.'0 6
Judge Learned Hand contemporaneously struggled with the same
dilemma, how to protect society without suppressing political dissent. In
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, the publisher of a revolutionary journal
sought an injunction to compel the postmaster to accept plaintiffs journal for
97 Id. at 624. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219, amended by
Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (Comp. St. 1918, § 10212(c)).
98 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 621-22.
99 Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 628-29 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
101 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 378-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
o4 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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mailing.' °7 The postmaster's defense rested on his claim that the journal vio-
lated the Espionage Act of 1917.1"8 For example, the postmaster argued that
political cartoons and text expressing sympathy for conscientious objectors vio-
lated the act's provision making it unlawful to cause "insubordination, disloy-
alty, mutiny or refusal of duty in the military."'
10 9
Hand sought to draw a clear line between protected and unprotected
speech.''o Even the Holmes-Brandeis interpretation of the clear and present
danger test left the speaker guessing when First Amendment protection began.
Depending on how imminent the harm might be, the same speech might be
protected in one setting but not in another. Unlike Holmes and Brandeis, who
focused on the effect of the speech, Hand focused on the content of the
speech."' For Hand, under the Espionage Act, a speech was not criminal
unless it directly counseled the listener to resist the draft, even if the speech
motivated the listener to resist the draft." 2 Words did not become criminal
unless they were a "direct incitement to violent resistance."1 1 3
The Second Circuit reversed Hand's decision in Masses Publishing. 114
Hence, neither the Holmes-Brandeis view nor the Hand view became the law,
at least until the late 1960s. But certainly from today's view of the First
Amendment, Holmes, Brandeis, and Hand deserve credit for their efforts to
limit the government's ability to criminalize political dissent. At least as devel-
oped in these cases, the defendants did nothing more than speak out in opposi-
tion to policies of the state or federal government. As applied by the Supreme
Court, the First Amendment did not go very far in protecting unpopular speech.
While the Holmes-Brandeis and Hand approaches both offered greater
protection than the Court did at that time, their approaches differed in signifi-
cant ways. In fact, the Marc Antony example served to demonstrate that differ-
ence. Under the Holmes-Brandeis approach, a court would have to determine,
based on an independent review of the record, whether he intended his speech
to result in the unlawful killing of the conspirators and that the risk of harm was
imminent.15 As developed in more detail below, Antony planned the very
harm that took place, and he expected it to take place immediately, allowing
him little protection under the Holmes-Brandeis approach." 16
In correspondence with Judge Hand, Professor Chafee posed the Antony
example.117 Like a true Socratic professor, Chafee posed the example to
demonstrate the weakness of Hand's approach in Masses Publishing." 8 While
107 244 F. 535, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
108 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217.
109 Masses Publ'g., 244 F. at 539.
110 Id. at 540.
"'I Gunther, supra note 73, at 720-21.
112 Id.
113 Masses Publ'g, 244 F. at 540.
114 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
"15 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
116 See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
117 Gunther, supra note 73, at 729 n.41.
118 Id. In one of his letters to Hand, the comment is made that "your test is certainly easier
to apply although our old friend Marc Antony's speech is continually thrown at me in dis-
cussion. After all, we ought to take the best test we can find, even though it will sometimes
break down." Id. at app. 1, doc. 16.
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Hand's approach did not subject the speaker to "the mercy of fact-finders
reflecting majoritarian sentiments hostile to dissent,"'1 9 his approach "could
not easily deal with the indirect but purposeful incitement of Marc Antony's
oration over the body of Caesar."' 2 0 While Hand recognized the social harm
posed by the indirect inciter, focusing on the literal meaning of the speaker's
words allowed a speaker to escape criminal liability through clever
manipulation. '
2
The difference between the two approaches is especially important today
because of their influences on modem First Amendment law. First, before the
Cold War, the Holmes-Brandeis approach gained acceptance,' 2 2 as the
Supreme Court began strengthening its clear and present danger test.' 23 Sec-
ond, after a significant step backwards in Dennis v. United States,124 the Court
again gave teeth to the First Amendment in a series of cases interpreting the
Smith Act,' 25 the 1940 legislation used during the 1950s to target members of
the Communist Party. For example, in Yates v. United States, 12 6 the Court
interpreted the Smith Act to require the jury to distinguish between advocacy of
abstract doctrine, protected by the First Amendment, and incitement or advo-
cacy of action, unprotected by the First Amendment.
While cases like Yates demonstrate increased awareness that the First
Amendment must protect political dissent, 27 the Court's approach to the First
Amendment issues changed even more markedly during the 1960s. For exam-
ple, the Court decided Brandenburg v. Ohio' 28 at the height of the Vietnam
anti-war and civil rights movements.
Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader, invited news reporters to a poorly
attended Klan rally.' 29 There, he was captured on film giving a speech at a
cross burning.' 3 ° His speech was remarkably temperate for a Klansman. In
fact, it is hard to determine whether Brandenburg threatened illegal action at
all. He stated, for example, that "[w]e are marching on Congress July the
Fourth, four hundred thousand strong. From there we are dividing into two
groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to march
into Mississippi. Thank you.' 13 1 Brandenburg was subsequently convicted of
violating Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute which made it unlawful to advo-
cate the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, or violence as a means
119 Id. at 721.
120 Id. at 729.
121 Id.
122 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-9, at 841-45 (2d ed.
1988).
123 Id. at 845-49.
124 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
125 Smith Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994)).
126 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
127 See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (defendant's conviction for violating the
membership clause of the Smith Act was reversed, on the ground that the evidence intro-
duced at trial was insufficient to show that the Communist Party engaged in actual advocacy
of governmental overthrow).
128 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
129 Id. at 445.
130 Id. at 446.
131 Id.
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to accomplish political reform. In the Supreme Court, Brandenburg contended
that his conviction under that law violated the First Amendment.
The Court found that the statute was unconstitutional because it purported
to punish mere advocacy. 132 It read its earlier case law as establishing that the
First Amendment protected advocacy of the use of force unless that advocacy
was aimed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action when that advo-
cacy is likely to produce such action. 133 The Court had no occasion in Bran-
denburg to decide whether the defendant's conduct was protected by the First
Amendment. 134
In the more than thirty years since Brandenburg, the Court has shed little
additional light on the line drawing required by its decision. In Hess v. Indi-
ana,135 a sheriff and his deputies were clearing the streets of anti-war protesters
when Hess, one of the protesters, said, "[w]e'll take the fucking street later," or
"[w]e'll take the fucking street again."' 1 36 Two witnesses testified that Hess
was not urging the crowd to take the street back and that "his statement did not
appear to be addressed to any particular person or group, and that his tone,
although loud, was no louder than that of the other people in the area.'
' 3 7
In a per curiam opinion, the Court overturned Hess's conviction for disor-
derly conduct. To overturn his conviction, the Court conducted an independent
review of the record, not bound by the trial court's factual determination.
Apparently placing on the state the burden of demonstrating that Hess's speech
was not protected by the First Amendment, the Court found the evidence of
both an intent to incite and a call for immediate action insufficient.' 38 As
observed by the Court, the evidence of an intent to incite lawless action was at
most ambiguous.139 The evidence did not reveal whether Hess was making a
call for moderation or, at worst, a call for illegal action at some future time. 140
Further, the state failed to show any specific action or any imminent violence
urged by Hess.
1 4
'
The only other case decided in reliance on the Brandenburg test was
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware.4 ' There, the African-American community
staged a boycott against white merchants in a small Mississippi town.143 White
merchants sued various defendants for the economic losses occasioned by the
132 Id. at 449.
13 Id. at 447.
134 The Court did not address that issue because it found that the statute was unconstitu-
tional on its face and did not reach the separate question whether Brandenberg's conduct was
protected by the First Amendment. That issue would arise only after Ohio passed a properly
narrowed statute and sought to convict Brandenburg for similar behavior. Then the Court
would have to address whether his conduct amounted to a direct incitement or to mere
abstract advocacy.
135 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
136 Id. at 106-07.
137 Id. at 107.
138 Id. at 108.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 109.
142 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
143 Id. at 889.
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boycott) 44 Most of the damages suffered were caused by lawful conduct, the
decision of those participating in the boycott not to patronize white owned
stores.145 However, the lower court found the NAACP and Charles Evers, its
local leader, liable for the full amount of harm caused by the boycott. 146 Their
liability was based on three speeches that Evers gave.
147
Members of the boycott formed an "enforcement" group and collected
names of African-Americans who violated the boycott. 148 The trial court found
that supporters of the boycott committed ten acts of violence against African-
Americans who patronized white owned businesses. 14 9 Some of those acts of
violence took place after speeches by Evers. 150 In those speeches, Evers made
statements that might have inspired members of the audience to use violence
against members of their community who were violating the boycott.
15
Because, according to the trial court, Evers was responsible for some African-
Americans being intimidated from patronizing white businesses, Evers was also
responsible for the harm suffered by the white plaintiffs. 15' Rather than finding
the NAACP and Evers liable only for the part of the damages that resulted from
his arguably illegal speeches, the trial court found the defendants liable for the
entire amount of the plaintiffs' losses, even though most of those damages were
the result of lawful conduct by members of the community.' 5 3
Again in a per curiam opinion, the Court reversed the judgment against the
NAACP and Evers. In finding that Evers' speech was protected by the First
Amendment, the Court discussed three possible theories by which Evers might
be found liable for the conduct of the enforcement group: if he authorized,
directed, or ratified specific tortious activity; if his speeches were likely to
incite his listeners to commit unlawful acts within a reasonable amount of time;
or if he gave specific instructions to carry out violent acts or threats. 154 The
Court rejected the lower court's finding that Evers did ignite the violent acts of
boycott supporters. It did make clear that, had Evers' strong language "been
followed by acts of violence, a substantial question would be presented whether
Evers could be held liable for the consequences of that unlawful conduct."'
' 55
Review of these three cases, Brandenburg v. Ohio, Hess v. Indiana, and
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, allows a few generalizations. Consistent with
the Holmes-Brandeis view, when the defendant has a First Amendment
defense, an appellate court has a greater than normal role in reviewing the facts
found in the trial court. 1 56 In effect, trial court findings are entitled to little or
no deference. In addition, while the Court seems to give greater substantive
144 Id.
145 Id. at 893.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 894-95.
149 Id. at 901-06.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 893.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 927.
155 Id. at 928.
156 See generally id.
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First Amendment protection to political dissent than did the Court in the "Red
Scare" cases, the extent of that protection is uncertain.
Here, the Marc Antony example demonstrates the uncertainty about the
substantive rule articulated in Brandenburg; uncertainty that remains after the
Court's decisions in Hess and Claiborne. How would that case be resolved
under Brandenburg?
Professor Gunther has argued that Brandenburg combines the best of the
Holmes-Brandeis approach and of Hand's approach in Masses Publishing.'5 7
Specifically, according to Professor Gunther, "[u]nder Brandenburg,
probability of harm is no longer the central criterion for speech limitations.
The inciting language of the speaker - the Hand focus on 'objective' words - is
the major consideration."' 15 8
If Professor Gunther is correct, Marc Antony could not be found guilty of
aiding and abetting murder or inciting violence against the co-conspirators. As
developed above, he carefully avoids any direct exhortation, any explicit call
for violence. For example, after the crowd calls for "Revenge! - About! -
Seek! - Bum! - Fire! - Kill! - Slay! Let not a traitor live!," Antony "appeals"
to the crowd, "let me not stir you up/To such a sudden flood of mutiny. ... '""
If Brandenburg, in fact, requires words of incitement as a necessary condition
for prosecution, Antony would have to be acquitted despite the fact that the
other requirements of the Court's test would otherwise be met. That is, the
harm is imminent - the crowd rushes away from Caesar's funeral and kills the
conspirators immediately, Antony's intent is not in doubt, and, although not
definitively resolved, if the Court requires that the harm threatened must be a
grave one, the killing of another obviously qualifies.
In neither Hess nor Claiborne did the Court indicate whether words of
incitement are necessary before a defendant may be prosecuted. Certainly, in
Claiborne, Evers used words of incitement - for example, he told one audience
that "any 'Uncle Toms' who broke the boycott would 'have their necks broken'
by their own people."' 60 Evers was not liable because the evidence was insuf-
ficient to show that his words caused the harm suffered by the white
merchants. 161
Hess's words might or might not have been words of incitement. 162 The
record did not support an inference of his intent - did he intend to call for
moderation or did he intend to urge some future criminal conduct - and it did
not support a finding that harm was imminent, again because, even if his words
were a call to action, the record did not indicate when the illegal conduct might
take place.163 The Court did not have independent evidence of Hess's intent
beyond his words.' 64 The additional evidence cited by the Court supported an
absence of an intent to bring about the feared harm. 1 6 5
157 Gunther, supra note 74, at 755.
158 Id.
15 Caesar, supra note 74, act 3, sc. 2, In. 199-200, 204-05.
'6o Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 900.
161 Id.
162 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973).
163 ld.
'64 id. at 109.
165 Id. at 107.
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Hence, since Brandenburg, the Court has not elaborated on whether words
of incitement are a necessary condition for conviction or if, absent words of
incitement, a defendant has a First Amendment defense as a matter of law. We
are left only with the Court's language in Brandenburg to try to divine whether
words of incitement are in fact a necessary condition for conviction.
The text is ambiguous. The Court stated that the First Amendment pro-
tects a speaker unless the speaker's advocacy is "directed to inciting or produc-
ing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." '66
Professor Gunther's position, that Brandenburg adopts Judge Hand's view, is
supported by its self-conscious use of the term "inciting," suggesting that words
of incitement are a necessary condition.1 67 No doubt, the Court was aware of
Judge Hand's use of that term. But, of course, the Court did not state explicitly
that a speaker has a First Amendment defense. Rather, it used an additional
term, advocacy directed to "producing" the imminent criminal conduct. Argua-
bly, unless the "producing" language was merely surplusage, the Court recog-
nized that language not explicitly inciting lawless conduct may nonetheless be
sufficiently dangerous that it should be criminalized.
Absent clear resolution in the Supreme Court case law, one ought to ask
whether the policies that support the First Amendment suggest that we ought to
protect speakers like Marc Antony. Most of the cases discussed above have
involved political dissent where the speaker has attacked governmental poli-
cies. While scholars have suggested that the First Amendment advances a
number of policies, most recognize that, at its core the First Amendment pro-
tects political speech necessary in a free society. Majoritarian sentiment
against dissenting voices is likely to be high, demanding prosecution for unpop-
ular ideas. In addition, even if majoritarian sentiment does not demand prose-
cution, those in power may want to silence dissent in order to cement their own
power. Certainly, cases like Brandenburg, Hess, and the Espionage Act and
Smith Act cases all demonstrate the legitimacy of those concerns. Allowing
the state to prosecute a political dissenter creates a chilling effect on the vigor-
ous debate necessary in a free society.
Supreme Court doctrine in a number of areas creates a zone in which a
speaker may advocate without fear of civil liability or criminal prosecution (or
confident that he or she has a defense if the speaker is prosecuted). A speaker
who criticizes a public official or public figure may not be found liable unless
the person claiming to be defamed can demonstrate that the speaker acted with
knowledge that the statements were false or made with reckless disregard of the
truth. 1 68 That burden is not easily met.
Brandenburg and Hess require that the state demonstrate that the speaker
had an intent to incite violence and that the unlawful conduct was imminent. ' 69
Unlike earlier precedent, the Court's current cases do not allow the legislature
to determine whether the harm is imminent; that must be demonstrated on a
166 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
167 Gunther, supra note 73, at 755.
168 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
169 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982); Hess, 414 U.S. at 109.
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case-by-case basis.' 7 ° The case law also demonstrates a commitment to full
judicial review in cases involving First Amendment defenses, apparently based
on a mistrust of jury determinations of fact since those determinations may be
motivated by the passions of the moment.17
Those are significant protections. For example, in Hess, the Court over-
turned a finding that Hess intended to incite the crowd because his statement to
the effect that the protesters would take the streets back later did not allow a
clear inference of his intent to bring about the feared harm.' 72
The Holmes-Brandeis approach has been criticized because the First
Amendment defense seemed to depend on events beyond the control of the
speaker and because it was so susceptible to the passions of the moment.'
7 3
For example, the clear and present danger test did little to protect the defend-
ants in Dennis v. United States,'7 4 a prosecution of Communists during the
height of the Cold War.'
75
I have argued elsewhere that many of the "Red Scare" cases, including
Dennis, would come out differently today, under Brandenburg and more recent
First Amendment cases. 176 Specifically, the intent requirement and the lack of
deference shown to findings in the trial court place a significant burden on the
prosecution. In addition, the modem cases force the prosecutor to show a
meaningful risk of actual harm following the defendant's speech.' 77 No longer
would a federal court sustain a conviction for aiding the Germans under a stat-
ute like the Espionage Act if a defendant merely encouraged resisting efforts to
ship arms to forces opposing the Bolsheviks. The prosecutor would have to
show that the defendants intended to frustrate the war effort against the
Germans. Knowledge that their conduct might have that effect is not enough
under Brandenburg's intent requirement. Similarly, a prosecutor could not rely
on a defendant's membership in an organization like the Ku Klux Klan or the
Communist Party to sustain a conviction; more would be necessary to show
that the defendant intended to support the illegal goals of the organization. 171
That is, earlier cases that seemed so ripe for criticism because they allowed
prosecution of political dissenters without more do not seem to have survived
Brandenburg.
One might argue, if Brandenburg did not adopt the additional requirement
of words of incitement, the objective approach urged by Judge Hand in Masses
Publishing, that the Court should do so. That argument would be grounded on
the need to provide the prospective speaker with certainty of the difference
between protected speech and criminal incitement.
170 This is shown by the Court's review of the trial record, with little deference given and a
high degree of emphasis placed on the facts. See generally Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886; Hess,
414 U.S. 105.
171 Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 915 n.50; Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
172 Hess, 414 U.S. at 108.
173 Gunther, supra note 73, at 749-50.
174 341 U.S. 494 (defendant convicted for violation of Smith Act).
175 Id.
176 Vitiello, supra note 2.
'17 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978).
178 See supra notes 38-55, 63-71 and accompanying text.
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A close examination of Marc Antony's speech helps show why that should
not be the case. Before examining Antony's First Amendment defense, one
ought to consider how his conduct would be judged but for the fact that he gave
his speech in a public place. As discussed above, when Lady MacBeth urges
MacBeth to murder the King or when lago deceives Othello into a murderous
rage, neither Lady MacBeth nor lago would have a First Amendment defense
despite the fact that their conduct is exclusively speech. Were Lady MacBeth
charged with murder, the prosecution would not have to prove any express
words of encouragement. It would be enough to show that whatever words
used (or any other aid) were intended to encourage the crime.' 7 9 In addition,
an appellate court would give no special deference to factual findings in the
lower court. Similarly, if Antony delivered his powerful encouragement behind
closed doors, it is inconceivable that a court would seriously consider a First
Amendment defense. Antony obviously encouraged the murder of the co-
conspirators.
Once he speaks in public, he seems to be entitled to First Amendment
protection. I find nothing in the case law which explains why that is so. I
suspect that it is so because those encouraging murder usually do not do so in a
public forum and because people speaking in public are more likely to be
engaging in political discourse than in a criminal conspiracy.
That seems implicit in cases like Brandenburg and Claiborne. Certainly
there is something sound in that position. While some sane people are willing
to admit openly their intent to commit crimes, most people speaking in a public
forum would not do so, suggesting that in fact, even harsh rhetoric is intended
as political dissent.
While scholars have differed about the theory underlying the First Amend-
ment, cases involving political dissent are the ones in which First Amendment
protection is most important.' 8 ° Government officials are most likely to have
an interest in suppressing speech in such cases. 8 ' Whether one believes that
the First Amendment is intended to assure our ability to engage in self govern-
ment, or that its protection is based on distrust of governmental determinations
of truth, cases where criticism of government is involved pose the greatest chal-
lenge for the courts.' 8 2
Despite his feigned praise of Brutus and the other co-conspirators,
Antony's speech certainly could be construed as criticism of the government
(now that the co-conspirators have usurped power). Antony's false praise
shares some of the characteristics of satire, a common form of political com-
mentary in tyrannical regimes.1
83
179 DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 30.04, at 436-38.
180 See Vitiello, supra note 2, at notes 342-47 and accompanying text, at 1221; see also
FREDERICK SHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 34 (1982).
181 See Vitello, supra note 2, at notes 342-47 and accompanying text, at 1221.
182 Id.
183 See DUSTIN GRIFFIN, SATIRE, A CRITICAL REINTRODUCTION 138 (1994) (rebutting the
contention that satire requires freedom of speech as an essential condition and observing that
"[iln the late twentieth century [satire] has appeared not in the liberal West but in Russia and
Eastern Europe.").
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But does the fact that Antony speaks in public and may be engaged in
political discourse create a risk sufficient to require an additional protection, to
find his conduct criminal only if he uses words of incitement? And here, I
assume that Judge Hand would have required a defendant like Antony to use
words like, "yes, be stirred to mutiny."
I think the additional requirement of words of incitement would be unfor-
tunate and unnecessary. Any marginal gains in First Amendment protection
would be outweighed by the grave social danger. Under this reading of Bran-
denburg and its progeny, that Antony did not use words of incitement would
provide him with a defense, if that is the only evidence of his intent to incite the
crowd to murder the conspirators. He consistently protests, urging the crowd to
desist from mutiny when members of the audience begin to demand revenge.
Like Hess's "[w]e'll take the fucking streets later,"' 84 Antony's intent should
not be inferred from words that allow competing rational inferences. If Antony
were convicted, an appellate court, acting in accord with Hess would exercise
independent review of the record, and would have to find unambiguous evi-
dence of intent.
Antony is unlike the defendant in Hess. Both before and after his funeral
oration, Antony makes his intent clear. Hence, neither the fact finder nor an
appellate court would have to guess whether Antony meant to incite the crowd.
In light of unambiguous admissions of his intent, the risk of criminalizing a
person advocating some abstract and future harm is non-existent. The require-
ment of a clear showing of intent goes a long way to protect against criminaliz-
ing political dissenters while protecting society against dangerous offenders.
IV. CONCLUSION
Thinking about the First Amendment in the context of Shakespearean
characters may suggest that the issues discussed in this essay are not serious,
contemporary problems. But as I have argued elsewhere, the Internet has
opened new avenues of speech, allowing dangerous speakers to share informa-
tion and to encourage social misfits to commit serious crimes. 8 5 lago, Lady
MacBeth, and Marc Antony have a great deal to teach us about speech and
crime.
Speech is powerful and may be dangerous. The criminal law has long
recognized that fact and, in numerous settings, criminalizes offenders whose
speech may consist of nothing but words.' 86 lago and Lady MacBeth more
than amply demonstrate the need to criminalize those whose conduct may con-
sist entirely of speech.
Obviously, speakers whose words may involve political dissent must have
strong First Amendment protection. However, I question whether the Supreme
Court has required, or should require, explicit words of incitement. As argued
above, leaving a speaker like Marc Antony free to manipulate others to commit
serious crimes, simply through the expedience of choosing his words carefully
184 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1973).
'85 Vitiello, supra note 2.
186 See supra note 4.
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is shortsighted and unnecessary.' 87 Forcing the prosecutor to make a clear
showing of the speaker's intent would give political dissenters protection while
allowing society to protect itself against dangerous offenders.
187 See supra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
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